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JURISDICTION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS
This Petition for Review by Appellant, Lindsay Germer, is from a final order of
the Labor Commission of Utah dated April 23,2008. This Court has jurisdiction over
this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §§ 34A-2-801(8)(a), 63G-4-403, and
78-2a-3(2)(a) (2009).

ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue 1 : Did the Commission properly determine the mechanism of accident
in this case?
Standard: A court must uphold the commission's factual findings if such
findings are supported by substantial evidence based upon the record as a
whole. Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403 (4)(g). See Brown & Root Indus. Serv.
v. Industrial Comm'n. 947 P.2d 671 (Utah 1997). To successfully challenge
an agency's factual findings, the party, "must marshall all of the evidence
supporting the findings and show that despite the supporting facts, and in light
of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the findings are not supported by
substantial evidence." Martinez v. Media-Pavmaster Plus. 2007 UT42 (Utah
2007); Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of Review of Indus. Comm'n. 776 P.2d 63,68
(Utah Ct. App. 1989); accord Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9) ("A party challenging
a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence that supports the
challenged finding.").

This requires counsel to construct the evidence
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supporting the adversary's position, and then "ferret out a fatal flaw in the
evidence." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah
1991). Compliance with this undertaking helps ensure that the factual findings
of the agency are overturned only when lacking in substantial evidence.

Issue 2: Was the Labor Commission "reasonable and rational" when it
determined that the higher standard of legal causation was not satisfied by kicking
a cooler door open while carrying trays of meat?
Standard: This involves the application of facts to the law where the Labor
Commission has a grant of discretion.

Reasonableness and rationality

standard applies. SeeA.E.CIevite. 2000 UT App 35, H1J6-7;1 Acosta v. Labor

1

In A.E. Clevite. Inc. v. Labor Comm'n. 2000 UT App 35,1J6, 996 P.2d 1072,
the court stated:
The applicable standard of review for a formal adjudicative
hearing is governed by the Utah Administrative Procedures Act
(UAPA). 'When the Legislature has granted an agency discretion to
determine an issue, we review the agency's action for reasonableness.
Caporoz v. Labor Comm'n. 945 P.2d 141, 143 (Utah Ct. App. 1997);
see Cross v. Board of Review of Indus. Comm'n. 824 P.2d 1202,1204
(Utah Ct. App. 1992) (stating 'when there exists a grant of discretion,
'we will not disturb the Board's application of its factual findings to the
law unless its determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness
and rationality') (citation omitted)....
In this case, the Legislature has granted the Commission
discretion to determine the facts and apply the law to the facts in all
cases coming before it. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-1-301 (1997). As
such, we must uphold the Commission's determination that [petitioner's]
injury "arose out of and in the course o f his employment, unless the
2

Comm'n. 2002 UT App 67,1J11. (Respondents disagree with Ms. Germer's
standard of review which she notes is a correction of error standard).

Issue 3: Did the Commission violate Ms. Germer's right to due process in
allowing a company representative to testify at hearing and in admitting certain
photographs?
Standard: Due process challenges are questions of law that the court reviews
under a correction of error standard. See West Valley City v. Roberts. 993
P.2d 252 (Utah 1999).
Issue 4: Did the Commission violate constitutional open court provisions
when it took nearly two years to issue its Order denying benefits?
Standard: Review of constitutional violations are questions of law, reviewed
for correctness. See Duke v. Graham. 2007 UT 31, ^7 (Utah 2007).

determination exceeds the bounds of reasonableness and rationality so
as to constitute an abuse of discretion under section 63-46b-16(h)(i) of
the UAPA. See Caporoz. 945 P.2d at 143 (indicating agency has
abused its discretion when agency action is unreasonable).
3

DETERMINATIVE LAW
The determinative law is Utah Code Ann. §34A-2-401 (Utah "Workers
Compensation Act"), the provision authorizing workers' compensation for industrial
accidents. This section reads as follows:
An employee described in Section 34A-2-104 who is
injured . . . by accident arising out of and in the course of
the employee's employment, wherever such injury
occurred, if the accident was not purposely self-inflicted,
shall be paid . . . compensation for loss sustained on
account of the injury . . . such amount for medical, nurse,
and hospital services . . . [and] medicines . . . .
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401 (2003).
The section emphasized above was interpreted by the Utah Supreme Court
in Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15, 18, 22-23 (Utah 1986), to require a
claimant to prove both medical and legal causation in order for the claimant to
establish his or her entitlement to workers' compensation benefits.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case and Course of the Proceedings
This case presents the question whether an employee of Famous Dave's is
entitled to worker's compensation benefits arising from an industrial event that
occurred while working as an assistant manager on October 30, 2004.
On April 1, 2005, Lindsay Germer (hereinafter, "Ms. Germer") filed an
Application for Hearing with the Utah Labor Commission. She alleged entitlement
to certain workers' compensation benefits from an October 30,2004 work accident
(hereinafter, the "accident"). (R., at 1)
On May 11, 2005, Famous Dave's and/or Wausau Insurance (hereinafter,
"Famous Dave's") filed an Answer to the Application for Hearing.

(R., at 12)

On May 13, 2005, Ms. Germer served certain Interrogatories and Requests
for Production of Documents and Things, via United States mail, on Famous Dave's.
On June 2, 2005, Famous Dave's filed an Answer to Ms. Germer's First Set
of Interrogatories and a Response to Ms. Germer's First Request for Production of
Documents and Things. (R., at 63).
On December 20,2005, Ms. Germer served on Famous Dave's a Second Set
of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents and Things.
On February 21, 2006, Famous Dave's filed an Answer to Ms. Germer's
Second Set of Interrogatories and a Response to Ms. Germer's Second Request for
Production of Documents and Things.
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On February 14, 2006, Ms. Germer filed Pre-Trial Disclosures. (R., at 19)
On February 21,2006, Famous Dave's filed Pre-Trial Disclosures. (R., at 24)
On March 8, 2006, Famous Dave's filed a Supplemental Answer to Ms.
Germer's Interrogatories. (R., at 72). On this same date, Famous Dave's also filed
Supplemental Pre-Trial Disclosures. (R., at 28)
Approximately seven to ten days prior to the evidentiary hearing, counsel for
Famous Dave's contacted counsel for Ms. Germer to discuss the Supplemental
Answers to Interrogatories provided by Famous Dave's to Ms. Germer. Counsel for
Famous Dave's informed counsel for Ms. Germer of Famous Dave's' intent to call
Scott Morton as a witness. The subject matter of Mr. Morton's testimony was
discussed during that telephone conversation. Counsel for Famous Dave's also
informed counsel for Ms. Germer that Mr. Morton would take several photographs
of the walk-in cooler at Respondent Famous Dave's Restaurant that would be
introduced into evidence at the evidentiary hearing for illustrative purposes.
Although available for review, counsel for Ms. Germer made no demand from
counsel for Famous Dave's to review the photographs prior to the evidentiary
hearing.
On March 31,2006, the ALJ conducted an evidentiary hearing. A copy of the
hearing record has been provided.
On April 5, 2006, the ALJ issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order. (R.,at45).
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On May 5, 2006, Ms. Germer filed a Motion for Review. (R., at 51)
On June 1, 2006, Famous Dave's filed a Response to the Motion for Review.
(R., at 82).
On June 27, 2006, Ms. Germer filed a Reply to Response to Motion for
Review (R., at 155).
On April 23, 2008,

the Commission entered an Order Affirming ALJ's

Decision. (R., at 164).
Ms. Germer has subsequently filed a Petition for Review to the Court of
Appeals.
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Statement of Facts
1.

Lindsay Germer began working for Famous Dave's as a server in June of
2004. As of October 30, 2004, she had been promoted to assistant
manager. (Tr., 22).

2.

Ms. Germer began work at 7:00 am on October 30, 2004. As part of her
duties she was required to go into a walk-in cooler to pick up trays of meat
that needed to be cooked for the day.

3.

The cooler door was fairly standard - three to four feet wide. (Tr., 24).
Although Ms. Germer testified at hearing that the cooler door stuck on
occasion, Ms. Germer and Scott Morton (the area manager) both testified
that the door on the cooler was fully operational at the time of her alleged
industrial accident. Several photographs of the cooler door were admitted
at hearing. (R. 34-37, 40-42, 44).

4.

At 9:00 am, Ms. Germer entered the cooler and picked up trays of meat in
the cooler, weighing collectively 48 pounds. (Tr., 28). Ms. Germer picked
up three trays of meat (each tray being 18" x 24", much like a cookie
sheet). (Tr., 27-28). Ms. Germer walked with the trays at waist height and
stepped in front of the cooler door. Ms. Germer stopped in front of the
cooler door and planted both feet since the inner floor of the cooler had
condensation from thawing meat. She did not make a forward continuous
movement toward the walk-in cooler door (Tr., 67). Ms. Germer stood
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about one to two feet from the cooler door and lifted her right foot and
kicked the door with he foot to open it. (Tr., 87). The door did not stick
shut. At that time, Ms. Germer felt immediate pain in her right knee. Ms.
Germer did not injure her right knee by slipping and falling to the cooler
room floor. Her feet were firmly planted and well-grounded. She did not
trip. She did not slip. She did not stumble. She did not awkwardly twist
her knee nor lose her balance. Ms. Germer's right knee made no direct
contact with the door or with the floor. (Tr., 30).
5.

Ms. Germer worked the remainder of her shift and the two days that
followed. (Tr., 33).

6.

On November 1, 2004, Ms. Germer sought medical treatment for right knee
pain. She was off work for several days and worked for another five
weeks, until December 13, 2004, at which time she resigned. (Tr., 34)

7.

On January 2, 2005, Ms. Germer began working for a new employer Outback Steakhouse - as a waitress.

8.

On February 5, 2005, Ms. Germer sought treatment with Dr. Scott Parry.
(R., 170 at 8). Dr. Parry noted that Ms. Germer has a long standing history
of right knee problems dating back to at least April 2001 when she had a
PCL reconstruction performed by Dr. John Edwards. Dr. Parry
recommended an MRI to assess the consequences of the October 30,
2004 industrial event. (R., 170 at 8).
9

9.

On February 25, 2005, Ms. Germer underwent surgery to her right knee for
a PCL reconstruction. (R., 170 at 125).

10.

On June 7, 2005, Dr. Parry indicated that Ms. Germer would likely reach
medical stability in August or September 2005. (R., 170, at 125).

11.

On September 27, 2005, Dr. Marble performed an independent medical
evaluation. He diagnosed Ms. Germer with chronic right knee pain status
post surgery in 1993, PCL reconstruction in 2001 and 2005 with
degeneration (R., 170 at 133). Dr. Marble notes a long standing history of
bilateral knee problems dating back to 1991, with several accidents
following that date. Dr. Marble noted that no additional care is warranted
on an industrial basis for the event on October 30, 2004. (R., 170 at 136).

12.

Ms. Germer's right knee problems are well documented in the medical
records submitted to the court. (R., 170). The parties do not dispute this
treatment.
A.

Ms. Germer was treated for a right knee condition as early as
January 14, 1991. Doctors note at that time that Ms. Germer had
patello-femoral pain following athletic activities.

B.

(R., 170 at 2).

In 1992, Ms. Germer underwent radiological studies at the Ogden
Clinic showing degenerative changes in her knee and probable knee
calcification. (R., 170 at 3).
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C.

Ms. Germer also fell onto her right knee on or about January 20,
2001, while working at an assisted living center (catching her toe on
the door jam of the floor) and was treated for a right knee sprain and
possible ligament tear. (R., 170 at 172). She was given crutches
and a knee immobilizer at that time. She underwent physical therapy
for her right knee for approximately thirty-three visits (33) in 2001.
She eventually underwent surgery to her right knee in February,
2001 performed by Dr. John Edwards. (R., 170 at 56).

D.

Following this surgery, Ms. Germer re-injured her right knee by
falling in April 2001. An additional surgery was performed on April
27,2001. (R., 170 at 106).

E.

In October 2001, Ms. Germer underwent hardware removal in her
right knee. (R., 170 at 163).

F.

Ms. Germer was also treated on December 27, 2003, for a right knee
sprain when she slipped on pavement. She was prescribed Percocet
for right knee pain.

G.

Ms. Germer continued to treat in January, 2004 for right knee
problems and underwent an MRI on January 14, 2004 due to
continued knee pain. (R.,170 at 114).

13.

Ms. Germer sought workers' compensation benefits as a result of the
October, 2004 event which were denied by Famous Dave's.
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14.

On April 1, 2005, Ms. Germer filed an Application for Hearing seeking
temporary total disability, permanent partial disability, medical expenses
and recommended medical care for the October 30, 2004 accident. (R., 1).

15.

On May 11, 2005, Famous Dave's filed an Answer denying compensability
for lack of medical causation, due to Ms. Germer's long standing history of
knee problems. Famous Dave's also denied Ms. Germer's claim for lack of
legal causation. (R., 13-14).

16.

On May 13, 2005, Ms. Germer served Interrogatories and Requests for
Production of Documents and Things, via United States mail, on Famous
Dave's.

17.

On June 2, 2005, Famous Dave's filed an Answer to Ms. Germer's First
Set of Interrogatories and a Response to Ms. Germer's First Request for
Production of Documents and Things. (R., 63).

18.

On December 20, 2005, Ms. Germer served on Famous Dave's a Second
Set of Interrogatories and Request for Production of Documents and
Things.

19.

On February 21, 2006, Famous Dave's filed an Answer to Ms. Germer's
Second Set of Interrogatories and a Response to Ms. Germer's Second
Request for Production of Documents and Things.

20.

On February 14, 2006, Ms. Germer filed Pre-Trial Disclosures. (R., 19).

21.

On February 21, 2006, Famous Dave's filed Pre-Trial Disclosures. (R., 24)
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22.

On March 8, 2006, Famous Dave's filed a Supplemental Answer to Ms.
Germer's Interrogatories. (R., 72). In the Supplemental Answer, Famous
Dave's informed Ms. Germer of Famous Dave's intent to call Scott Morton
as a witness at the evidentiary hearing. Famous Dave's provided Ms.
Germer with a summary of the testimony to be solicited from Mr. Morton.

23.

On March 8, 2006, Famous Dave's also filed Supplemental Pre-Trial
Disclosures. (R., 28). Again, Famous Dave's notified Ms. Germer of their
intent to call Scott Morton as a witness. Famous Dave's also notified Ms.
Germer of their intent to submits photographs of the walk-in cooler and
cooler door at Famous Dave's Restaurant in St. George. (R., 29).

24.

Approximately seven to ten days prior to the evidentiary hearing, counsel
for Famous Dave's contacted counsel for Ms. Germer to discuss the
Supplemental Answers to Interrogatories provided by Famous Dave's to
Ms. Germer. Counsel for Famous Dave's informed counsel for Ms. Germer
of Famous Dave's' intent to call Scott Morton as a witness. The subject
matter of Mr. Morton's testimony was discussed during that telephone
conversation. Counsel for Famous Dave's also informed counsel for Ms.
Germer that Mr. Morton would take several photographs of the walk-in
cooler at Respondent Famous Dave's Restaurant that would be introduced
into evidence at the evidentiary hearing for illustrative purposes. Although
available for review, counsel for Ms. Germer made no demand from
13

counsel for Famous Dave's to review the photographs prior to the
evidentiary hearing. Moreover, counsel for Ms. Germer made no request
to schedule the deposition or to conduct any sort of interview of Mr. Morton.
25.

On March 31, 2006, the ALJ conducted an evidentiary hearing. A copy of
the hearing record has been provided. At the hearing, Ms. Germer testified
regarding her medical history and the mechanism of accident on October
30, 2004.

26.

Over the objection of Ms. Germer, Famous Dave's was allowed to present
testimony of Scott Morton, the area director for Famous Dave's. (Tr., 99).
Ms. Germer objected to the testimony of Mr. Morton since Famous Dave's
did not designate Mr. Morton as a witness in their initial discovery
responses. Famous Dave's argued that Ms. Germer had notice of Mr.
Morton in supplemental responses and in pre-trial disclosures of March 8,
2006.

27.

At hearing, the ALJ admitted photographs of the cooler and cooler door.
(R., 34-44).

28.

Mr. Morton testified that no one had ever reported the cooler door sticking
and that Ms. Germer did not report any malfunctioning door to Mr. Morton
at any time (TR, at 123-124).

29.

On April 5, 2006, the ALJ issued Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and
Order. (R., 45). The ALJ found that Ms. Germer had a pre-existing right
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knee condition that contributed to the claimed industrial accident, giving
rise to the application of the higher standard of legal causation. The ALJ
found that the mode of injury did not satisfy the higher standard of legal
causation. On this basis, the ALJ found that Ms. Germer's claim was not
compensable under Utah law.
30.

On May 5, 2006, Ms. Germer filed a Motion for Review. (R.,51). Ms.
Germer argued that the ALJ erred in allowing testimony of Mr. Morton and
photographs of the cooler into evidence. She also argued that the ALJ
erred in evaluating the legal causation test given the weight of the meat
Ms. Germer was carrying. (R., 60-61). Ms. Germer did not argue (1) that
the ALJ disregarded evidence that the floor was wet with condensation; or,
(2) that the ALJ disregarded medical records of her orthopedic surgeon
whom she now states noted the, "forcefulness" of her fall.

31.

On June 1, 2006, Famous Dave's filed a Response to the Motion for
Review. (R., 82).

32.

On June 27, 2006, Ms. Germer filed a Reply to Response to Motion for
Review (R., 155).

33.

On April 23, 2008, the Commission entered an Order Affirming ALJ's
Decision. (R.,164). The Commission agreed with the ALJ that Ms. Germer
did not satisfy her burden of establishing that the higher standard of legal
causation was met. Specifically, the Commission found that the cooler door
15

kicked by Ms. Germer did not stick when she kicked it. The Commission
also found that prior to the accident, Ms. Germer had a pre-existing right
knee condition and had undergone several surgeries to repair
the right knee. (R., 164).

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENTS
First, the Commission properly determined that Ms. Germer's industrial
claim was not compensable for failing to satisfy the higher standard of legal
causation as articulated in Allen v. Industrial Commission. Ms. Germer failed to
show that the mode of accident was an unusual or extraordinary exertion when
compared to non-industrial 20th century activities. There is substantial evidence
to support the Commission's finding regard the mode of accident. Indeed, Ms.
Germer's testimony revealed that, while carrying trays of meat, she kicked the
cooler door with her right foot while her left foot remained grounded. Ms. Germer
was not in continuous motion at the time of the event and was well- balanced on
both when she kicked the door open. She did not trip. She did not slip. She did
not stumble. She did not fall to the ground. In fact, Ms. Germer's right knee never
came in direct contact with the cooler door, nor did her right knee come in contact
with the cooler floor as she slumped to the ground after kicking the door with her
right foot.
Given the mechanism of injury, the ALJ and Commission acted reasonably
and rationally in finding that the physical exertion placed on Ms. Germer's right
knee at the time she claimed to have kicked the walk-in cooler door with her right
foot was not extraordinary or unusual. The trays of ribs that Ms. Germer held in
her arms at the time of the alleged accident had no bearing on the physical
exertion, if any, placed on Ms. Germer's right knee at the time she attempted to
17

kick the walk-in cooler door with her right foot. Ms. Germer did not injure her right
knee from having carried the trays of ribs. Moreover, there was nothing awkward,
extraordinary or difficult about her effort to hold the trays of ribs as Ms. Germer
attempted to kick the walk-in cooler door with her right foot. Despite carrying the
trays of ribs, Ms. Germer was balanced, well-grounded, and stable at the time
she claims to have kicked the door with her right foot.
The Commission and ALJ properly examined the mechanism of injury in
the context of the Allen decision to activities in non-employment life. The
Commission properly determined that in non-industrial life, persons use their feet
to kick a door, slide a box or garbage can, or even move furniture or other items.
Oftentimes, such an action may occur while the person is lifting or carrying
certain objects. The ALJ and Commission were also correct to discern that
individuals in their non-employment life use their feet to kick a ball while engaging
in a sport or other type of extra-curricular activity. This alleged accident is also
similar to non-employment physical activities such as climbing or descending
stairs, or stepping on uneven surfaces.
Second, the Commission did not violate Ms. Germer's right to due process
in admitting testimony of Scott Morton and photographs of the cooler and cooler
door. Contrary to Ms. Germer's argument, she was not surprised by this
evidence. Several weeks prior to the evidentiary hearing, Famous Dave's
informed Ms. Germer of this testimony and evidence by way of pre-trial
18

disclosures, supplemental discovery and telephone conferences with Ms.
Germer's attorney. However, Ms. Germer's counsel made no request to depose
Mr. Morton, conduct any sort of pre-hearing interview of the intended witness or
to view the photographs of the cooler.
Third, the Commission's delay to issue a decision in this case, while
unfortunate to all parties, has no bearing on Ms. Germer's right to compensation
or the outcome of this case.
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ARGUMENT
POINT 1:

THE LABOR COMMISSION PROPERLY DETERMINED THAT MS.
GERMER'S INDUSTRIAL INJURY CLAIM WAS NOT
COMPENSABLE

Under the Utah Worker's Compensation Act, Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401
(2004), an employee is entitled to worker's compensation benefits for injuries
occurring, "by accident arising out of and in the course of the employee's
employment." id. To receive benefits, a claimant must, among other things,
prove by a preponderance of evidence a causal connection between the injury
and the activities or exertions in the work place. See Allen v. Industrial
Commission. 729 P.2d 15, 18, 22-23 (Utah 1986). To do so, the claimant must
prove both legal and medical causation. See id. at 25. In Allen, the threshold
case on this issue, the Court stated:
Where a claimant suffers from a preexisting condition which
contributes to the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is
required to prove legal causation. Where there is no preexisting
condition, usual or ordinary exertion is sufficient.
Allen. 729 P.2d at 26.
Ms. Germer argues that the ALJ and Commission's findings of fact must be
reversed since they do not consider the, "totality of the circumstances" and
"disregard uncontroverted evidence." Specifically, she argues that the
Commission disregarded crucial evidence that: (1) the floor was wet with
condensation at the time of accident; (2) medical records of Dr. Germer note the
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"forcefulness" of her fall; and, (3) Ms. Germer was carrying a large cookie sheet
with fifty pounds of meat at the time of the accident. She argues that had the
ALJ and Commission considered this evidence, her mode of injury would satisfy
the higher standard of legal causation. Ms. Germer's arguments lacks merit for
several reasons.
A.

Ms. Germer has failed to Marshall the Evidence.

Ms. Germer's argument - that the court disregarded crucial evidence in
rendering its finding regarding the mode of injury - must fail at the outset as she
has failed to marshal the evidence as required by law. Utah's appellate courts
have held that to successfully challenge an agency's factual findings, the party
"must marshall all of the evidence supporting the findings and show that despite
the supporting facts, and in light of the conflicting or contradictory evidence, the
findings are not supported by substantial evidence." Martinez v. MediaPavmaster Plus. 2007 UT 42 (Utah 2007); Grace Drilling Co. v. Bd. of Review of
Indus. Comm'n. 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah Ct. App. 1989); accord Utah R. App. P.
24(a)(9) ("A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all record evidence
that supports the challenged finding."). This requires counsel to construct the
evidence supporting the adversary's position, and then "ferret out a fatal flaw in
the evidence." West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co.. 818 P.2d 1311,1315 (Utah
1991). Compliance with this undertaking helps ensure that the factual findings of
the agency are overturned only when lacking in substantial evidence.
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Ms. Germer does not marshal the evidence. Ms. Germer is required to list
all of the evidence which supports the findings of the Commission and then
demonstrate that the evidence is inadequate to sustain the findings. See
Valcarce v. Fitzgerald. 961 P.2d 305, 312 (Utah 1998). Since Ms. Germer has
failed to marshal the evidence, the Court of Appeals is bound to assume that the
record supports the Commission's findings. See Wade v. Stagl. 869 P.2d 9, 12
(UtahCt.App. 1994).
B.

There is Substantial Evidence To Support the Commission's
Findings Regarding What Exertions Were Involved in the Work
Accident.

Even assuming, arguendo, that Ms. Germer satisfies her burden to marshal
the evidence, there is substantial evidence to support the Commission's factual
findings regarding the mechanism of injury.
In the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, the ALJ states in
relevant part:
Petitioner's claim arises from an incident that occurred on October
30, 2004. Petitioner was in the cooler to pick up some meat that
needed to be cooked for the day. When she attempted to leave the
cooler, the Petitioner alleges that the door was stuck closed, and that
when she kicked the door with her foot, she felt immediate pain in
her knee and she "went down" on both knees.

Petitioner testified that she was in the cooler.. .to obtain some meat that
needed to be cooked for the day. She testified that she picked up three
trays (each being approximately 18" x 24" much like a large cookie sheet)
which weighed approximately 50 pounds total. She was careful to
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approach the door and was holding the meat at about waist height. She
stopped in front of the door to make sure her feet were "grounded."
[because she knew the floor was wet]. This she explained was that she
balanced on both feet. She was standing about one to two feet from the
door at that time. She lifted her right foot and kicked the door "as hard as
she could", expecting it would open. It did not. She felt immediate pain in
her right knee... During the course of cross examination, Petitioner
demonstrated the incidents of the morning of October 30, 2004. She held
the tray (empty) in the approximate waist high position, and approached
the door in the Courtroom for demonstration purposes. She stood near the
door and described her activities. Of particular note is that Petitioner
claimed during her testimony and during the demonstration that she kicked
the door with her foot. However, at the distance she indicated she was
standing from the door, at best she could have kicked the door with the ball
of her foot (toes). Then she stated that the initial contact was with the toe
area of her foot, then involved the full flat part of her foot. The does not
appear possible at the distance she testified she was standing to wit: one
to two feet from the door.
Petitioner's testimony was further contradicted when she
stated that she was standing balanced and "grounded" on both feet
and her full body weight was moving toward the door. In the position
she demonstrated her body was at rest, she not in continuous motion
towards the d o o r . . .
(R., 170 at 46-47).
In its Order Affirming ALJ's Decision, the Commission found as follows with
regard to the mechanism of injury:
The Commission adopts Judge Sessions Findings of Facts.
The facts relevant to the motion for review are as follows: On
October 30, 2003, Ms. Germer was retrieving trays of meat out of a
walk-in cooler at Famous Dave's. As she held the meat trays in front
of her, Ms. Germer kicked on the cooler door with her right foot in
order to open the door. She felt immediate pain in her right knee.
Although Ms. Germer claims that the door stuck when she kicked it,
the evidence demonstrates that it did not stick. Prior to this accident,
Ms. Germer had a pre-existing right knee condition and had
undergone several surgeries to repair the right knee. (R., 170 at 164)
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First, Ms. Germer argues that the court disregarded crucial evidence - that
the floor was wet with condensation - which had a significant bearing on the
case. However, Ms. Germer did not argue at the evidentiary hearing, or in her
Motion for Review that condensation on the floor had any bearing on the court's
evaluation of legal causation. On this basis, she has waived this argument on
appeal. See Brown & Root Indus. Serv. v. Industrial Comm'n. 947 P.2d 671 (Utah
1997) (failure to raise issues in Motion for Review are deemed waived on appeal
as they are not properly preserved); Whitear v. Labor Comm'n. 973 P.2d 982
(Utah 1998). In any event, the ALJ's Order appears to have considered the
surface of the floor when the ALJ recognized that Ms. Germer's feet were
"grounded" immediately prior to kicking the door. Apparently, Ms. Germer
grounded her feet since she knew the floor was wet with condensation. (Tr., 29,
66).
Second, Ms. Germer argues that the court disregarded medical records of
her orthopedic surgeon whom she states noted the "forcefulness" of her fall.
Again, Ms. Germer did not raise this issue in her Motion for Review and,
therefore, has waived such a challenge on appeal. Notwithstanding, the ALJ
properly evaluated the mode of injury- as kicking the door - rather than events or
forces subsequent to the accident. Indeed, in evaluating legal causation, the
focus is on the actual impact or the physical exertion on the right knee from the
work accident, rather than the consideration of events leading up to or after the
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accident. This means the focus must be on the forces acting upon Ms. Germer's
right knee at the time of the workplace event.
Third, Ms. Germer argues that the court disregarded the fact that she was
carrying a large cookie sheet with fifty pounds of meat at the time of the accident
which is relevant to the legal causation evaluation. Ms. Germer again did not
argue this in her Motion for Review and has waived this issue on appeal.
Notwithstanding, the ALJ and Commission orders clearly recognize that Ms.
Germer was carrying three trays of meat, totaling a combined weight of 50
pounds at the time of the accident. (R., 46-48,164-65). Even with these trays in
hand, however, the court found Ms. Germer's body balanced when she kicked
the door open. She did no trip. She did not stumble. She did not fall. The fact that
Ms. Germer has hold a tray of meat at the time she kicked the cooler door with
her right foot had no bearing on the physical impact upon Ms. Germer's right
knee caused by Ms. Germer kicking the cooler door. Accordingly, there was no
error committed by the court.
C.

The Labor Commission Acted Reasonably and Rationally in
Ruling That Ms. Germer's Injury Did Not Meet the Higher Legal
Causation Standard

This Court must next evaluate whether the Commission acted reasonably
and rationally in ruling that the activities of October 30, 2004 did not rise to the
level of an unusual or extraordinary exertion.
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There is no dispute that the higher standard of legal causation as
articulated in Allen applies in this case.2 Ms. Germer does not dispute the
application of this standard, but rather argues that the mechanism of injury was
an "unusual or extraordinary exertion", sufficient to meet this test.
Ms. Germer's accident does not meet the higher standard of legal
causation. In Allen v. Industrial Commission. 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986), the
threshold case on this issue, the Court stated:
Where a claimant suffers from a preexisting condition which
contributes to the injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is
required to prove legal causation. Where there is no preexisting
condition, usual or ordinary exertion is sufficient.

2

Ms. Germer acknowledges that she suffered from chronic left and right knee
problems which pre-dated the accident. While still in high school, Ms. Germer
underwent both left and right knee surgeries to remove loose cartilage (R., 170 at
002). In 1991 and 1992, Ms. Germer sought medical care for complaints of bilateral
knee pain (R., 170 at 002). In 1993, Ms. Germer underwent bilateral knee surgery
for persistent complaints of left and right knee pain. In January 2001, while
employed as a CNA, Ms. Germer caught her right toe in a door jam and tripped and
landed on her right knee. She was diagnosed with a right TCL, MCL, LCL, and
lateral meniscus tears (R., 170 at 172). Ms. Germer was then referred to physical
therapy for almost six months.
On April 27,2001, Ms. Germer underwent a right knee PCL reconstruction (R.,
170 at 60-70). On October 22, 2001, Ms. Germer's right knee hardware was
removed (R., 170 at 163). On December 27,2003, Ms. Germer jumped from a snow
bank and landed on her right knee. The right knee gave way (R., 170 at 107).
From Ms. Germer's chronic and long-standing right knee problems, it is not
disputed that Ms. Germer brought an added risk of injury to her right knee to her
employment with Respondent Famous Dave's. The ALJ and the Commission were
correct to find that Ms. Germer's accident is subject to a higher standard of legal
causation.
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Legal Cause - Whether an injury arose out of or in the course of
employment is difficult to determine where the employee brings to the
workplace a personal element of risk such as a preexisting condition.
Just because a person suffers a preexisting condition, he or she is
not disqualified from obtaining compensation. Our cases make clear
that "the aggravation or lighting up of a pre-existing disease by an
industrial accident is compensable . . . . " To meet the legal causation
requirement, a claimant with a preexisting condition must show that
the employment contributed something substantial to increase the
risk he already faced in everyday life because of his condition. This
additional element of risk in the workplace is usually supplied by an
exertion greater than that undertaken in normal, everyday life. This
extra exertion serves to offset the preexisting condition of the
employee as a likely cause of the injury, thereby eliminating claims for
impairments resulting from a personal risk rather than exertions at
work. Larson summarized how the legal cause rule would work in
practice as follows: If there is some personal causal contribution in
the form of a [preexisting condition], the employment contribution
must take the form of an exertion greater than that of nonemployment
life....
If there is no personal causal contribution, that is, if there is no prior
weakness or disease, any exertion connected with the employment
and causally connected with the [injury] as a matter of medical fact is
adequate to satisfy the legal test of causation. Thus, where the
claimant suffers from a preexisting condition which contributes to the
injury, an unusual or extraordinary exertion is required to prove legal
causation. Where there is no preexisting condition, a usual or
ordinary exertion is sufficient.
We believe an objective standard of comparison will provide a more
consistent and predictable standard for the Commission and this
Court to follow. In evaluating typical nonemployment activity, the
focus is on what typical nonemployment activities are generally
expected of people in today's society, not what this particular claimant
is accustomed to doing. Typical activities and exertions expected of
men and women in the latter part of the 20th century, for example,
include taking full garbage cans to the street, lifting and carrying
baggage for travel, changing a flat tire on an automobile, lifting a
small child to chest height, and climbing the stairs in buildings. By
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using an objective standard, the case law will eventually define a
standard for typical "nonemployment activity" in much the way case
law has developed the standard of care for the reasonable man in tort
law.
Allen v. Industrial Comm'n. 729 P.2d 15, 26-27 (Utah 1986).
The Commission found that the mechanism of injury occurred while Ms.
Germer was carrying approximately fifty pounds of ribs on three metal trays from
a walk-in cooler. Ms. Germer approached the walk-in cooler door and stopped
one to two feet from the cooler door. Both of Ms. Germer's feet were grounded
on the walk-in cooler floor (Tr., 66-67) due to condensation on the floor. Ms.
Germer was balanced while holding the trays of ribs in her hands at an angle, the
front edge of each tray resting against her abdomen. Ms. Germer was standing
still (Tr., 67). She did not make a forward continuous movement toward the walkin cooler door (Tr., 67). Ms. Germer then kicked the door with her right foot (Tr.,
87). The bottom of Ms. Germer's right foot contacted the walk-in cooler door first
(Tr, 87-88). Ms. Germer did not injure her right knee by slipping and falling to the
cooler room floor. She did not trip. She did not stumble. She did not awkwardly
twist her knee nor lose her balance. Ms. Germer's right knee did not come in
direct contact with the freezer door, nor did her right knee directly hit the cooler
floor as she slumped to the floor after kicking the cooler door.
Given the mechanism of injury, the ALJ and Commission acted reasonably
and rationally in finding that the physical exertion placed on Ms. Germer's right
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knee at the time she claimed to have kicked the walk-in cooler door with her right
foot was not extraordinary or unusual. See Bigler v. TW Services. MD 95-0838CA (8/8/96) (a one time lunge and twist to catch a falling object is not uncommon
of activities in everyday life and does not involve unusual exertion).
The trays of ribs that Ms. Germer held her in arms at the time of the alleged
accident had no bearing on the physical exertion, if any, placed on Ms. Germer's
right knee at the time she attempted to kick the walk-in cooler door with her right
foot. Certainly, Ms. Germer did not injure her right knee from having carried the
trays of ribs. There was nothing awkward, extraordinary or difficult about her
effort to hold the trays of ribs as Ms. Germer attempted to kick the walk-in cooler
door with her right foot. Despite carrying the trays of ribs, Ms. Germer was
balanced, well-grounded, and stable at the time she claims to have kicked the
door with her right foot. Holding the tray of ribs against her abdomen did not
cause Ms. Germer to trip, slip, stumble, lose her balance, or footing, or cause her
to fall to the cooler floor.
Famous Dave's agrees with the ALJ and the Commission that it is a
common experience of non-employment life for persons to use their feet to kick a
door, slide a box or garbage can, or even move furniture or other items with a leg
or foot. Often such an action may occur while the person is lifting or carrying
certain objects. The ALJ and the Commission was also correct to discern that
individuals in their non-employment life use their feet to kick a ball while engaging
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in a sport or other type of extra-curricular activity. This alleged accident is also
similar to non-employment activities such as climbing or descending stairs, or
stepping on uneven surfaces. In this case, the physical exertion placed upon Ms.
Germer's right knee at the time of the accident was de minimis. Ms. Germer's
accident does not meet the higher standard of legal causation. The Court of
Appeals should affirm the ALJ's decision to deny workers' compensation benefits
to Ms. Germer because her claim did not meet the higher standard of legal
causation.

POINT 2:

THE COMMISSION DID NOT VIOLATE MS. GERMER'S RIGHT
TO DUE PROCESS WHEN IT ADMITTED CERTAIN EVIDENCE.

Ms. Germer was not surprised by the testimony of Scott Morton or the
photographs of the walk-in cooler which were introduced as evidence
at the evidentiary hearing.
Ms. Germer next argues that she was denied due process when the court
allowed the testimony of Scott Morton and photographs of the walk-in cooler at
the evidentiary hearing. Famous Dave's disagrees and submits that there was
no due process violation.
Section 34A-2-802 of the Utah Code states that the Commission is not
bound by usual common law or statutory rules of evidence, or by technical or
formal rules of procedure. Notwithstanding, Utah Courts have held that these
rules must not deprive parties of their constitutional right to an impartial hearing.
See Ocean Accident & Guarantee Corp. v. Industrial Comm'n. 245 P. 343 (Utah
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1926); Workers Comp. Fund v. Industrial Comm'n. 761 P.2d 572 (Utah Ct. App.

1988).
Article 1, Section 7 of the Utah Constitution allows for due process of law.
Additionally, the Utah Administrative Procedure's Act guarantees parties a
reasonable opportunity for a fair hearing. See Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-206.
Utah's courts have interpreted these sections to entitle a party to notice of
proceedings and the opportunity to present testimony and witnesses at
administrative proceedings. See Workers Compensation Fund v. Industrial
Comm'n. 761 P.2d 572 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). In WCF. the court held:
[i]t is fundamental that in investigations such as the Industrial
Commission is authorized to make, any party to a cause or
proceeding is entitled to be advised of and afforded an opportunity to
meet such evidence as the commission may consider and rely on in
the making of its findings and decision.
Id- at 575-76.
Three weeks prior to the evidentiary hearing, Famous Dave's provided
Supplemental Answers to Ms. Germer's previous discovery requests. (R., 63).
In the Supplemental Answers, Famous Dave's informed Ms. Germer of their
intent to call Scott Morton as a witness at the evidentiary hearing. Famous
Dave's provided Ms. Germer with a summary of the testimony to be solicited from
Mr. Morton at the evidentiary hearing. Famous Dave's also submitted this
information to the Commission in the pre-trial disclosures on March 8, 2006. (R.,
28). Famous Dave's was not obligated, as Ms. Germer suggests, to inform Ms.
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Germer of each and every bit and piece of testimony to be solicited from a
witness at the evidentiary hearing. Given the nature of the claim and legal
causation defense raised in Famous Dave's' Answer, Ms. Germer knew, or
should have known, that Famous Dave's would call Mr. Morton, or other
manager, to testify regarding the operation of the walk-in cooler door, and that the
subject of the functionality of the walk-in cooler would be addressed by Mr.
Morton. Ms. Germer could have deposed Mr. Morton prior to the evidentiary
hearing, or made some effort to interview this witness, if Ms. Germer was
concerned with what testimony Mr. Morton was to offer at the evidentiary hearing.
Ms. Germer made no request to depose or to interview Mr. Morton once Ms.
Germer had been notified that Famous Dave's would call Mr. Morton to testify.
Even after counsel for Famous Dave's spoke to counsel for Ms. Germer
several days prior to the evidentiary hearing by telephone, during which
telephone conversation, counsel for Famous Dave's informed counsel for Ms.
Germer that Mr. Morton would be called to testify, counsel for Ms. Germer made
no oral or written request to depose or to interview Mr. Morton, or make any effort
to discover the details of Mr. Morton's testimony.
In addition, there is no merit to Ms. Germer's argument that she was
prejudiced by Mr. Morton's testimony that the cooler floor was, "coming up." The
condition of the cooler floor had nothing to do with Ms. Germer's reported
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accident. Consequently, Ms. Germer made no effort herself to focus on this issue
at the hearing, or to call any witness to support this argument.
Moreover, during counsel's pre-hearing telephone conference, counsel for
Ms. Germer made no oral or written request to review the photographs which
were to be provided, for illustrative purposes, to the ALJ for review at the
evidentiary hearing. Ms. Germer was not surprised or tricked by Mr. Morton's
testimony or the introduction of the walk-in cooler photographs. In reality,
however, neither Mr. Morton's testimony nor Famous Dave's submission of the
walk-in cooler photographs had any bearing on the ALJ or Commission's finding
that Ms. Germer's alleged accident did not meet the higher standard of legal
causation. The photographs were merely introduced into evidence by counsel for
Famous Dave's so that the ALJ would have a better understanding of the lay-out
of the walk-in cooler and cooler door as Ms. Germer provided her testimony to
ALJ. The photographs served a dual purpose to aide both the ALJ and Ms.
Germer as she explained her injury event to the ALJ. The substance of Mr.
Morton's testimony and the existence of the walk-in cooler photographs
were fairly disclosed to Ms. Germer's legal counsel prior to the evidentiary
hearing. Counsel for Ms. Germer simply failed to act on this information prior to
the evidentiary hearing.
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POINT 3:

THE COMMISSION DID NOT VIOLATE THE OPEN COURT'S
PROVISION OF THE UTAH CONSTITUTION WHEN IT ISSUED
THE ORDER DENYING BENEFITS.

Ms. Germer next argues that the Commission violated the Open Court's
Provision of the Utah Constitution when it took nearly two years to issue the
Order denying benefits. Ms. Germer cites to Utah Const. Art I. § 11 which
provides:
All courts shall be open, and every person, for an injury done to him
in his person, property or reputation shall have remedy by due
course of law, which shall be administered without denial or
unnecessary delay.
Utah Const. Art. 1, § 11. This constitutional provision has been interpreted to
guarantee that litigants will have their "day in court." Miller v. USAA Cas. Ins.
Co.. 2002 UT 6, H38, 44 P.3d 663; Duke v. Graham. 2007 UT 31, 1J23 (Utah
2007).
A Motion for Review of the ALJ's Order was filed by Ms. Germer on May 5,
2006. The Commission entered its Order Affirming ALJ's Decision on April 23,
2008. Famous Dave's recognizes Ms. Germer's concern that the administrative
appeals process comes with delay. It is also in the interest of Famous Dave's
to have orders from the Commission issued in a more expedited fashion, if
possible. Certainly, such delay affects not only the claimant, but also the
employer and insurance carrier. However, the Commission's delay in this case
has no bearing on whether Ms. Germer is entitled to workers' compensation
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benefits, or whether she was provided a fair hearing and the opportunity to be
heard.
The Commission's delay to issue an order on Ms. Germer's Motion for
Review did not violate the open court's provision of the state constitution. Ms.
Germer had her "day in court." She was given the opportunity to present her case
before an impartial administrative law judge. Unfortunately, the delay in the
appeals process stems from the significant number of cases heard at the
Commission and Appeals Board levels. Cases at the Commission are
adjudicated by seven Administrative Law Judges. Fortunately, given the number
of judges, hearings are promptly scheduled within four to five months from the
date of filing of the Application for Hearing. Labor Commission orders are now
issued within only a three to four months after the hearing. However, between
2006 and 2008, staffing at the Commission appeals level provided for only a
staffed attorney (General Counsel), to review motions for review, and submit
recommendations to the Appeals Board or Commissioner for final resolution.
Unfortunately, during that time period, funding provided by the Legislature did not
allow the Commission to hire additional legal staff at the Commission appeals
level to keep up with the high numbers of appeals filed by aggrieved parties.
Since then, the Legislature has increased funding to the Commission which has
permitted additional attorney staffing to review appeals and provide a more
expedited review a cases.
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CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, Respondents ask the Court of
Appeals to affirm the Commission's Order Affirming ALJ's Decision. Petitioner's
workers' compensation claims should be dismissed with prejudice.
Respectfully submitted this

.TTday of March, 2009.
BLACKBURN & STOLL, LC

Kristy L. Bertelsen
Attorneys for Appellees Famous Dave's and/or
Wausau Insurance. Co.
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II. ISSUES;.
: Md the industrial event of October 30,2004 cause Lindsay Germer's right knee
problems u issue in this case? (Legal Causej

p
A

0
!

2.
)id the industrial event of Octobe 30,2004 cause Lindsay Germer to suffer any
periods of temporary total disability?

jj
A

3
J>id the industrial event of October 30,2004 cause Lindsay Germer to suffer any
p< rmanent partial disability? (Medical Cause s

&
f(

6
HI. COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS.

fcj

8
ITiis hearing was the origuial evi<J ,mtiary hearing in the matter. No prior hearings
were conducted.
IV. FINDINGS OF FACT
A.

Employment

The parties agreed that Respondent famous Dave's employed Lindsay Germer, from June
3,2004 to December 13,2004,
B.

Compensation Rate.

At the time of the accident in issue, Lindsay Genner, H I married with H P dependent
children. The parties stipulated that Lindsay Germer's compensation with Famous Dave's and
Wausau Insurance Company at the time of the accident in issue equaled $430.00 per week as the
computation rate for temporary total disability compensation.
C

The Industrial Accident

Petitioner's claim arises from an incident feat occurred on October 30, 2004. Petitioner
was in the cooler to pick up some meat that needed to be cooked for the day. When she
attempted to leave the cooler, the Petitioner alleges that the door was stuck closed, and that when
sbe kicked the door with her foot, she felt immediate pmn in hot knee and she Vent down* on
both knees. It is not disputed that Petitioner was acting in the course and scope of her
employment on the dale of the incident Legal cause under the higher Allen v. Industrial
Commission, 729 P.2d 15 (Utah 1986) standard is disputed because of undisputed extensive preexisting conditions to Petitioner's right knee.
D,

Other Relevant Findings.

00046

£j.

Findings t f Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order
Lindsay Gerraer vs. Famous Dave's and/or Wausau Insurance Company Case No. 05-0318
Page 3

1. vVhile Petitioner initially testified that die door on the new walk-in cooler always
stuck in th i closed position, she later changrxl her testimony to reveal that on the morning of the
incident s' te had entered the cooler and it had in fact not stuck. She also testified that she
reported the malfunctioning door to Mr. M< >rton. However, the testimony of Scott Morton (the
; -ea manager who was at the location for significant periods of time from construction to the
present d e) was that in fact the door die? not stick and despite the claim to the contrary by
Petitioner, no employee including Petitione had ever complained of a sticking door on the new
cooler. Petitioner changed her testimony on this issue or, cross examination to state that she did
r >t report the malfunction to Mr. Morton. The weight of the evidence in the regard
\ -eponderates in favor of the testimony by \ ur. Morton.
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2. Petitioner testified that she was in the cooler at approximately 9:00 AM to obtain
some meat that needed to be cooked for tho day. She testified that she picked up 3 trays (each
being approximately 18** x 24" much like a large cookie sheet) which weighed approximately
50Ibs total. She was careful to approach the door and was holding the meat at about waist
height, She stopped in front of the door to make sure her feet were 'grounded.' This she
explained was that she was balanced on boih feet. She was standing about one to two feet from
the door at that time, She lifted her rigM foot and lacked the door 'as hard as she could',
expecting it would open. It did not, She felt immediate pain in tierrightknee. In her words 'she
went dowu on both knees/ The pain was severe. There is no indication that she dropped the
meat. Th* demonstration showed that she managed to keep the meat in front of her throughout
the incident.
3. After she caught her breath, she placed the meat on the chicken boxes located next to
tl e door and used her body weight to open the door. She worked the remainder of the shift that
d ty and the two days that followed.
4. Two days later, November 1, 2004, she sought medical care for the pain. Petitioner
was off work from November 1 to November 4, then worked approximately 5 weeks (often up to
80-90 hours per week) to December 13, 2004 at which time she resigned her position. On
January 2, 2005 she was working for The Outback as a waitress working from 9-13 hours per
day.
5. During the course of cross examination, Petitioner demonstrated the incidents of the
morning of October 30 2004, She held the tray (empty) in the approximate waist high position,
and approached the door in the Courtroom for demonstration purposes. She stood near the door
and desctibed her activities. Of particular note is that Petitioner claimed during her testimony
and during the demonstration that she kicked the door with her foot. However, at the distance
she indicated she was standing from the door, at best she could have kicked the door with the
ball of her foot (toes). Then she stated that the initial contact was with the toe area of her foot,
then involved the full flat part of her foot. This does not appear possible at the distance she
testified she was standing to wit: one to two feet from the door.
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6. Petitioner's testimony was further contradicted when she stated that she was standing
balanced a id * grounded* on both feet and h*r full body weight was moving toward the door. In
the positio i she demonstrated, her body was at rest, not in continuous motion toward the door,
nor could u be at that close proximity to the Joor. She was at rest and balanced.
7. t is undisputed that Petitioner has had prior surgeries to her right knee including a
reconstruction of her PCL {posterior crucial 5 ligament). Injury to her right knee is documented
back to agt* 14. Petitioner was born in 1976.
V, CONCI USIONS OF LAW

f\

!-(

o
i?j
y
^

0
Petitioner bears the burden of proof s a both legal and medical causation. Turning first to
k gal cause: To qualify for benefits under this standard, an injured worker must, among other
things, establish that his or her exertions at r/ork were the Hegal cause* of the injury in question*
Alien v. Industrial Commission, at 25. In AfoeRiver Coal Co, v. Industrial Commission* 731
P,2d 1079,1082 (Utah 1986), the Utah Supreme Court described the test for legal causation as
follows:
Under Allen^ a usual or ordinary i icertion with the employers duties will
Suffice to show legal cause. However, if the claimant suffers from a prelisting condition, then he or she must show that the employment activity
involved some unusual or extraordinary exertion over and above the 4tusual
wear and tear and exertions of nonemployment life." . . . The requirement
of Unusual or extraordinary exertion'' is designed to screen out those
injuries that result from a personal condition which the worker brings to the
job, rather than from exertions required of the employee in the workplace.
(Citations omitted,)
In American Roofing v. Industrial Commission, 752 P,2d 912 (Utah App., 1988), the
Utah Court of Appealsfindingthat while twisting, bending or lifting in themselves are not
unusual, the combination of bending, twisting and jerking a substantial weight is unusual. The
combination of actions satisfied the more stringent prong of Alien.
In Allen the Supreme Court gave specific examples oftypicalnon-employment life
exertions such as iftaking full garbage cans to the street, lifting and carrying baggage for travel,
changing a flat tire on an automobile, lifting a small child to chest height and climbing stairs in
buildings." Here Ms. Gtrmer's incident included lifting approximately 50lbs and carrying it to
another part of the restaurant for cooking. It cannot be said that this lifting alone is extraordinary
or unusual. The focus then becomes die mechanics of the incident (including the exertion of
force demonstrated at the time of injury) when injury occurred.
Petitioner was in the act of carrying an arm load of meat. She states that she stopped at
the door made sure she was balanced on both feet and then lifted herrightleg and kicked the
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door with th : toes of her foot. It is common experience for people to use their feet to kick or
otherwise as Jst in sliding boxes and garbage c $ns while moving them. It is common experience
for people tc use the toes (or ball) of their feet to open or close a door. It may even be common
for people tc use the toes or ball of their feet tv kick a ball when active in sports such as soccer or
foe <-ball in ordinary life.
The evidence preponderates in support >f the interpretation that using the facts as
described and demonstrated by Petitioner: thatfroma distance of one to two feet from the door,
staring from a resting position when both feet <*reflaton theflooraind the body is balanced and
the light foot is raised to kick the door open* tl J force used or exerted in attempting to open the
doc is no mire significant thu the force used n noaemployment life to accomplish the same or
sim, lar purposes. The proof of legal cause has Med.
Of the issues raised by Petitioner in th« Application for Hearing, legal cause is the
threshold issue. Havingfoiledto meet thai thr^ shold burden of proof the remaining issues are
moot It is well established in Utah law that ornrts,and by extension, administrative agencies,
should not adjudicate claims when such adjudication will have no practical effect. "Once a
controversy has become moot, a trial court should enter an order of dismissal** Merhish v. H.A.
Fohon & Associates, 646 P.2d 731,732 (Utah 1982)> See also: Kerning Lu v. St. Marks
Hospital* 8010440 (LC Appeals Board, January 2005). Therefore, no further discussion of the
remaining issnes will be set forth here.
VI. ORDER
IT ta THEREFORE ORDERED that Petitioner's Application for Hearing is dismissed with
prejudice and on the merits,
DATED Aprii^2006.

'Judge
NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
A party aggrieved by the decision mayfilea Motion for Review with the Adjudication
Division of the Utah Labor Commission, The Motion for Review must set forth the specific
basis for review and must be received by the Commission within 30 daysfromthe date this
decision is signed. Other parties may then submit their responses to the Motion for Review
within 20 days of the date of the Motion for Review.
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/ ny party may request that the Appeals Board of the Utah Labor Commission conduct
the foregou g review Such request must be included in the party's Motion for Review or its
response I none of the parties specifically request review by the Appeals Board, the review will
be conducic i by the Utah Labor Commission
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I hereby cerafy that a true and correct copy ot the attached Findings of Fact, Conclusions of
Law, and O dec, was mailed by prepaid U.S. postage on Apnl X 2(006, to the persons/parties at
th< following addresses:
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Lu dsay Germer
23. 5 W Sunbrook Dr #59
St George I T 84770
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Fataous Dave's
39!SRiverRd
St George UT 84770
Wausau Insurance Company
PO Box 4025
BeavertonOR 97076
Aaron Prisbrey Esq
1011 E100SBldgD-3s
SKeorgeUT 84770
Bret Gardner Esq
257E200SSte800
Salt Lake City UT 84 111
UTAH
CM
PO Box 146615
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-6615
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UTAH LABOR COMMISSION
LINDSAY GI HMER,
Petition er,

1

vs.

1j

FAMOUS DAVE'S a»d
WAUSAU INSURANCE
COMPANY,

ORDER AFFIRMING
ALI'S DECISION
Case No. 05-0318

Respondents.
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Lindsay Germer asks the Utah Labor Co nmission to review Administrative Law Judge
Sessions' denial of Ms, Germer's claim for bene^is under the Utah Workers' Compensation Act,
Title 34A, Chapter 2, Utah Code Annotated.
The Labor Commission exercises jurisdiction over this motion for review pursuant to Utah
Code Annotated § 63*46b-12 and g 34A-2-8O10?
BACKGROUND AND ISSUE PRESENTED
Ms. Germer claims workers' compensation benefits from Famous Dave's and its insurance
carrier, Wausau Insurance Company (referred to jointly as "Famous Dave's"), for a work accident
that occ irred on October 30, 2003, allegedly causing injury to her right knee. After holding an
evident) try hearing, Judge Sessions denied benefits.
I n her motion for review, Ms. Germer argues that hkd Famous Dave's given her proper notice
of the substance of the testimony of one of its witnesses, she would have been able to refute the
evidence that she claims led Judge Sessions to conclude there was no legal causation.
FINDINGS OF FACT
The Commission adopts Judge Session'sfindingsof facts. The facts relevant to the motion
for review are as follows: On October 30, 2003, Ms, Germer was retrieving trays of meat out of a
walk-ir. cooler at Famous Dave's. As she held the meat trays infrontof her, Ms, Germer kicked on
the cooler door with her right foot in order to open die door. She felt immediate pain in her right
knee. Although Ms. Germer claims that the door stuck when she kicked it, the evidence
demonstrates that it did not stick. Prior to this accident, Ms. Germer had a preexisting right knee
condition and had undergone several surgeries to repair the right knee.
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DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION OF LAW
Section 34A-2-401 of the Utah Workers' Compensation Act provides benefits to workers
injur* d by accident "arising out of and in the cour e of* employment. To qualify for benefits under
the ft /egoing standard, an injured worker must es-1 abiish that his or her work was the 'legal cause" of
the injur>\ AlLnv Industrial Commission, 7291 2d 15,25 (Utah 1986). The requirement of legal
causation is explained tn Price River Coal Co. v. i» >du$!rial Coi mission, 731 P.2d 1079,1082 (Utah
1986)Under Alien, a usual or o? iinary exertion^ so long as it is an activity connected with
the employee's duties, will suffice to she w legal cause. However, if the claimant
suffers from a pre-existing condition, then he or she must show that the employment
activity Involved some unusual or extr ^ordinary exertion over and above the
**usuaJ wear and tear and exertions of nor-employment life"... The requirement of
"unusual or extraordinary exertion" is des:gned to screen oui those injuries that result
from a personal condition which the worker brings to the job, rather than from
exertions required of the employee in the vorkplace, (Citations omitted; emphasis
added.)
Because Ms. Germer suffered from a preexisting condition that contributed to her current
knee problems, tier claim is subject to the more stringent test for legal causation, which requires that
she show her work related exertion was "unusual or extraordinary." The Commission understands
Ms. Germer to argue that her exertion in kicking the door was unusual or extraordinary because the
door w is stuck and did not swing freely. The Commission has found that the door did not stick.
Neverti cless, even assuming the door did stick, the Commission is not convinced that this exertion
would qualify as "unusual or extraordinary exertion" as compared to the usual wear and tear
exertions of nonemployment life. Therefore, the Commicsion concludes that Ms. Germer has not
satisfied the test for legal causation and eannot prevail on her claim for benefits.
ORDER
The Commission affirms Judge Session's decision, It is so ordered.
Dated this JJ

day * .f April, 2008,
Sherrie Hayashi
Utah Labor Commissioner

IMPORTANT! NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS FOLLOWS ON NEXT PAGE.
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NOTICE OF APPEAL RIGHTS
Any party may ask the Labor Commission toreconsiderthis Or ier. Any such request for
recom deration nust be received by the Labor Commission within 20 days of the date of this order.
Alternatively, aj.y party may appeal thisorder to tl e Utah Court of Appeals by filing a petition for
review with the court. Any such petition for review must be rect ived by the court within 30 days of
the date of this order.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
1 certify that a copy of the foregoing On er Affirming ALJ's Decision inthe matter of
Lindsay Germer, Case No. 05-0318, was mailed Urst class postage prepaid this^^day of April,
2008, to the following:
Lindsuy Germer
1735 W 540 N #1202
St George UT 8-770
Famous Dave's
391SF\verRd
StGeor.'.cUT 84770

Aaron Prisbrey, Esq.
1090 E Tabernacle St
St George UT 84770
Bret Gardner, Esq.
257 E 200 S Ste 800
Salt Lake City UT 84111

Wausau Insurance Company
C. T. Corp. System Designated Agent
136 ES Temple Ste 2100
Salt Lake City UT 84111
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